Undergraduate Sample Law Essay - Writing a Legal Judgment

Here is an example of an undergraduate level law essay that gives a legal judgment in response to a problem question.

Judgment, Court of Appeal

Smith LJ: Clarice Smith, the appellant, is appealing against the findings of the Divisional Court which rendered her criminally liable under section 2 of the Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006. The Divisional Court held that (1) a private member’s club admitting paid-up members with an undefined number of guests was enough to constitute a public place, (2) a meeting called to draft a response to a government report on climate change did not constitute a lawful excuse under s.4 of the Act, since the police had already advised that the meeting should not go ahead, and (3) the “hours of darkness”[1] should be construed widely to incorporate those hours in which, by virtue of adverse weather conditions or other causes, it was actually dark. The necessity of maintaining public order during actual hours of darkness outweighed any inconvenience to those who sought to organise meetings within controlled areas. I will now consider each of the issues respectively.

Public place

In the decision of the Divisional Court it was held that a private member’s club admitting “paid-up members together with an undefined number of guests was open to a sufficiently wide cross-section of the public to constitute a public place.”[2] For the purpose of the Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006, “public place”[3] is any place to which the “public has access as of right or by virtue of any express or implied permission”[4]. This legal definition of a “public place”[5] therefore raises an important issue: what exactly constitutes ‘public’?

The case of R v Bentham takes precedence on the issue as to what constitutes ‘public’ within the context of the Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006. Affray LJ concluded that the football stadium was a public place on the grounds that the demonstration was “advertised to the public at large”[6]. The advertisement for the rally was aimed at the entire public, therefore placing no restrictions as to who may attend. By virtue of limited space within the football stadium, however, the entire public could not attend the rally and it can consequently be maintained that an invitation of anyone at large is enough to constitute a rally being earmarked public, where actual attendance of the entire public is unnecessary.

Under the direction of R v Bentham, a place will only be public if it is open to everyone at large. In the case of R v Smith the meeting took place in a meeting room of a “private sports and social club”[7]. Generally, in order to enter the social club, a person must be a paying member who is allowed to admit guests on a once-only basis. However, “only members of AGLOW were allowed access to the meeting, and they were ‘signed-in’ to the club as its guests for the duration of the meeting”[8]. It is hence true that the club at large was enough to constitute a public place since its admittance of paying members and guests does extend the radius of entry to within the public sphere. However, the meeting took place in a “large meeting room” [9]that was part of the club, to which only AGLOW members were admitted. Whereas, in the case of R v Bentham, the rally took place in a football stadium, which constitutes a single area due to the lack of physical separations such as walls and since the public were invited into that one place, then the stadium was regarded as a public place. Whereas, in the present appeal, the meeting room was a place within the club separated by walls, and should thus have been regarded as a separate area from the club in that point in time when the meeting was held. It would thus be reasonable to conclude that AGLOW meeting was privately rather than publicly held on the grounds that (1) ‘public’ at large was excluded and (2) in the light of the precedent set by R v Bentham, the meeting room was physically separated from club by walls, therefore comprising a separate area to which regular rules of the club did not apply.

Definition of ‘lawful excuse’

In the context of the statutory provision, “lawful excuse”[10] can only include matters of “public safety, emergency or other legitimate public interest”[11]. However, as to what exactly constitutes a “legitimate public interest” is left vague and broad. In this case, applying the Ejusdem generis rule, “legitimate public interest”[12] should be limited to the context of the preceding words. Both “emergency”[13] and “public safety”[14] are words that carry connotations of a ‘physical threat’ to public order. Thus in order for one’s action to constitute a “lawful excuse”[15], one must not be presenting a ‘physical threat’ to public order. Let us now clarify the ‘physical threat’ test in the context of leading authorities. In the case of R v Mill, I agree with Mayhem LJ in that the appellant’s actions of supplementing nightly police patrols with fifty local citizens in public areas which experienced mounting disorder can only “inflame an already difficult situation and create further problems of public order”[16]. Such a view can be attributed to the fact that Mill and other citizens were engaging in an active and physical activity, which conveys undercurrents of virtually certain confrontations and potentially violence since groups of a dozen were formed in order to ensure the “protection”[17] of the citizens. In this instance I can only see this protection taking a physical form in order to repel any belligerent attacks, and I thus hold that Mill’s actions constituted a ‘physical threat’ to the public order and cannot therefore constitute a lawful excuse for his actions.

Application of ‘lawful excuse’ to the present appeal

Having established and illustrated as to what constitutes a lawful excuse; let us now turn to the current appeal. The police had advised the appellant that the meeting should not go ahead. However, in order to do so, the police must justify that the meeting constituted a ‘physical threat’ to public order. The term ‘physical threat’ can narrowed and clarified through the authority of  DPP v Jones where the House of Lords held that an assembly in a public place cannot be rendered ‘unlawful’ unless it fails to be “non-obstructive, orderly and wholly peaceful”[18]. Before we turn to the current appeal, I am of a view that the police are on a threshold of breaching article 11 on the European Convention of Human Rights, which stipulates that freedom of assembly can only be restricted in the “interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals”[19]. In the case of R v Smith, the main and sole intention of the assembly was to submit a report to the government regarding global warming. This activity can only be described as diplomatic and physically passive and cannot therefore be seen as a ‘physical threat’ to public order or be in breach of Article 11 on the European Convention of Human Rights. Instead, I hold the police officer to be at fault for failing to justify the ‘unlawfulness’ of the meeting in terms of leading authorities or even the Convention rights, and I dismiss the view that the police can justify their arrest of the appellant in the case where the latter fails to follow the “advi[c]e”[20] of the former, where advice is a mere opinion and not authority. The police officer must have overreacted to the ‘pressure group’ label attached to the assembly rather than have examined the substantive activities of the group. The “advi[c]e”[21] provided by the police accordingly fails to show any “reasonable grounds”[22] for disbanding the assembly as it fails to show that the meeting was reasonably likely to experience “acts of civil disorder unrest or violence”[23] as stipulated by section 1. (2) of the Act. For reasons given, I thus arrive at a conclusion that the activities of the appellant constituted a “lawful excuse”[24] under s.4 of the Act, on which ground the appellant should be freed from any culpability under the Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006.

Interpretation of darkness

It is of material importance to establish as to the meaning of “hours of darkness”[25] provided in the Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006, and its application and validity in the current appeal. Lord Justice Affray takes a somewhat flexible interpretation of “hours of darkness”[26] in his reasoning in R v Bentham by maintaining that “hours of daylight”[27] are sufficient to constitute liability under section 2 of Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006 given that the underlying reason of the Act is to serve the purpose of a “deterrent”[28]. I am in total agreement with this view of substance rather than letter, and believe that senior police may exercise their discretion in determining the commencement of “hours of darkness”[29] in order to enforce the deterrent purpose of preventing “disorder and the occurrence of violence and the threat of violence”[30].On this note, I agree with the earlier reasoning in R v Smith that “official sunset”[31] should not be the exhaustive criterion for deciding the “hours of darkness”[32]. However, this discretionary approach of establishing the commencement of “hours of darkness”[33] cultivates potential problems. Firstly, in order for a group of entities to establish the requisite degree of darkness, they must be operating within an open space or at least a space from which the light intensity can be reasonably expected to be established without much effort. This condition holds true in the case of R v Bentham as the demonstration took place in a football stadium which impliedly had an open space where it was fairly easy for demonstrators to establish the intensity of light in the stadium from the light falling onto the stadium from the sky. Yet, if the stadium had floodlights, then the demonstrators could have inferred whether it was dark or not depending on whether the lights were on or off. In the present case the place of gathering was a large meeting room which by definition should not have contained any open spaces in view of the fact that they would have made it impossible to hold a meeting in late October when the temperature is relatively low. Even if the meeting room did contain any open spaces such as windows, the activity of taking an occasional look outside to determine the intensity of light would have been unreasonable as it would have distracted the members of the Action on Global Warming (AGLOW) from their pursuits. I hold that it was completely rational for the members of the AGLOW to be relying on the official time of the sunset given the enclosed area of operation and the nature of their pursuit. Provided with differing material facts, the case of R v Smith should be confined to its own facts, and the appellant and members of AGLOW should not be viewed to have been operating in the “hours of darkness”[34].

I allow the current appeal on the basis that (1) the appellant had a “lawful excuse”[35] for conducting the meeting by not providing any ‘physical threat’ to the public order and adhering to the rules set out by the European Convention on Human Rights as well as past precedents. Although I am also of opinion that AGLOW’s actions could be categorised under the headings of “emergency…public safety”[36] since UK is currently experiencing unprecedented flood levels which have thus far claimed numerous lives and unless global warming is curtailed, many more lives could inevitably be at stake. (2) The meeting room cannot be regarded as a public place as only AGLOW members were admitted to the meeting and the physical separation of the meeting room from the social club meant that the meeting room was independent of the rules that applied to the rest of the social club. (3) I agree with the third issue that actual darkness should represent the “hours of darkness”[37] only where there are open spaces within a premises, yet such is immaterial as to the outcome of the current appeal.

Bibliography

1. Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006.
2. DPP v Jones (Margaret). [1999] UKHL.
3. European Convention on Human Rights: 1953.
4. R v Bentham. [2006] EWCA Crim.
5. R v Mill. [2007] EWCA Crim.
6. R v Smith. [2007]

[1] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[2] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[3] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[4] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[5] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[6] R v Bentham. [2006] EWCA Crim. at p.2 per Affray LJ.

[7] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[8] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[9] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[10] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[11] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[12] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[13] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[14] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[15] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[16] R v Mill. [2007] EWCA Crim. at p.3 per Mayhem LJ.

[17] R v Mill. [2007] EWCA Crim. at p.3 per Mayhem LJ.

[18] DPP v Jones (Margaret). [1999] UKHL at p.6 per Lord Irvine.

[19] European Convention on Human Rights: 1953

[20] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[21] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[22] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[23] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[24] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[25] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[26] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[27] R v Bentham. [2006] EWCA Crim at p.2 per Affray LJ.

[28] R v Bentham. [2006] EWCA Crim at p.2 per Affray LJ.

[29] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[30] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[31] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[32] R v Smith. [2007] at p.4 per Anon.

[33] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[34] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[35] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[36] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006

[37] Curfew and Civil Disorder Act 2006: 2006